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INTRODUCTION 
The United States public consistently relies on press coverage of 
leaked material to hold government actors accountable for controversial 
operations.1 Despite the important and prominent role of confidential 
sources in government reporting, commentators and jurists have 
debated whether or not reporters are protected from being required to 
reveal information about those confidential sources for over forty years. 
In other words, the existence of a reporter’s privilege2 is still debated. 
The incertitude began with the Supreme Court’s enigmatic 1972 decision 
Branzburg v. Hayes3—the Court’s only decision addressing the existence 
of a reporter’s privilege.4 The failure to clarify this decision has 
produced significant disagreements between the circuits regarding the 
existence and scope of the reporter’s privilege.5 This confusion among 
the circuit courts is embodied in the Fourth Circuit’s 2013 decision 
 
 1. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and 
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 513–14 (2013) 
(noting that the “contours” of “[t]he Bay of Pigs, the Pentagon Papers, warrantless 
wiretapping by the National Security Agency at home, [and] targeted killings by the Central 
Intelligence Agency abroad	.	.	.	emerged	.	.	.	through anonymous disclosures of confidential 
information to the press”). 
 2. Reporter’s privilege (which this Recent Development also refers to as “journalist-
source privilege”) is defined as a “reporter’s protection under constitutional or statutory law, 
from being compelled to testify about confidential information or sources.” Journalist’s 
Privilege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Analogous to other legal privileges, 
such as attorney-client, spousal, and doctor-patient, the rationale for granting reporters and 
journalists special protection is based upon several considerations, including whether “(1) the 
relationship is one in which open communication is important to society; (2) in the absence of 
a privilege, such communication will be inhibited; and (3) the cost to the legal system of losing 
access to the privileged information is outweighed by the benefit to society of open 
communication in the protected relationship.” Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need a Federal 
Reporter’s Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39, 40 (2005). 
 3. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 4. See KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34193, JOURNALISTS’ 
PRIVILEGE: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND LEGISLATION IN RECENT CONGRESSES 1 (2011) 
(“The Supreme Court has written only one opinion on	.	.	.	journalists’ privilege: Branzburg v. 
Hayes	.	.	.	.”). 
 5. See infra Section I.B. This is despite the Supreme Court’s claim that “[a]n uncertain 
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the 
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.” Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) 
(quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)). 
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United States v. Sterling.6 While the Sterling majority held that 
Branzburg foreclosed the possibility of providing special First 
Amendment protection to reporters against federal subpoenas in 
criminal cases,7 the dissent found that this increased testimonial 
protection was entirely consistent with Branzburg.8 
As exemplified by the divided three-judge panel in Sterling, the 
post-Branzburg debate has been convoluted. Since Branzburg, scholars 
have debated what effect, if any, increased protections for journalists 
would have on the collection and dissemination of information by the 
press. On one side, proponents of a reporter’s privilege assert that 
protections facilitating and supporting press-society conversations are in 
the best interest of the public.9 If these pivotal conversations are not 
subject to any legal protection, they argue, then fear of punishment, 
retaliation, injury to reputation, and loss of privacy will severely limit the 
quality and quantity of this communication, if not eliminate it 
altogether.10 In contrast, others view the addition of journalist-source 
protections as an impediment to the truth-seeking function of the 
judiciary, since it has the effect of excluding evidence that “might be 
very trustworthy and highly relevant.”11 Additionally, these opponents 
view a reporter’s privilege as unnecessary to the promotion of the free 
flow of information, arguing that investigative journalism has thrived in 
this country despite the absence of explicit First Amendment or 
congressional protections.12 
And yet, while the clear judicial or legislative adoption—or even 
rejection—of a federal reporter’s privilege is traditionally seen as the 
ideal solution to the Branzburg inconsistency, this Recent Development 
suggests that this proposed remedy may ultimately be futile. Congress 
and the Supreme Court’s continued unwillingness to recognize a 
uniform federal reporter’s privilege has adversely affected reporters and 
their sources by facilitating inconsistent and unfair treatment of 
reporters across jurisdictional lines. Meanwhile, technological 
 
 6. 724 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 7. Id. at 505. 
 8. Id. at 523–24 (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
 9. See Stone, supra note 2, at 42. 
 10. Id. at 41. 
 11. E.g., Susan Webber Wright, A Trial Judge’s Ruminations on the Reporter’s Privilege, 
29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 103, 104 (2006) (asserting journalist-source privilege should 
be left to legislators and limited to civil cases). 
 12. See Randall D. Eliason, The Problems with the Reporter’s Privilege, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1341, 1355 (2008) (“Watergate, Iran-Contra, Abu Ghraib, secret CIA prisons, domestic 
National Security Agency (‘NSA’) surveillance—all of these stories and countless others were 
reported through the use of confidential sources, and all without a federal shield law.”).  
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advancements that allow the government to obtain the same confidential 
information without a subpoena13 and the recently leaked guidelines 
governing the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) use of National 
Security Letters (“NSLs”) in the news media14 indicate that the central 
threat to newsgathering is no longer the existence or lack of federal 
testimonial protection. Rather, because these developments hinge solely 
on government behavior outside the subpoena process, increased 
testimonial protection for reporters is no longer capable of remedying 
the negative effects on the newsgathering and news dissemination 
processes. Therefore, the more significant danger is now found in the 
government’s ability to gather information regarding a reporter’s source 
of confidential information through means other than judicial 
subpoenas. Consequently, an effective solution to the modern reporter’s 
privilege debate must take this concern into account. 
This Recent Development proceeds in three parts. Part I examines 
the Branzburg opinion, discusses the widely divergent treatment of 
Branzburg among federal and state courts, and analyzes the holding of 
and facts surrounding Sterling. Part II assesses the concerns resulting 
from the conflicting interpretations of Branzburg and surveys proposed 
solutions, specifically a federal shield law, the creation of a common-law 
privilege pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) guidelines for subpoenaing reporters. 
Finally, Part III argues that the proposed solutions to the reporter’s 
privilege debate fall short by failing to consider two recent 
developments. First, technological advancements now allow the 
government to readily access confidential reporter-source 
communications, which ultimately provide them with the same 
information that they would gain through a reporter’s testimony in 
court. Second, the government’s use of NSLs allows them to bypass the 
DOJ guidelines and subpoena authorization process altogether. These 
developments indicate that the newsgathering concerns regarding the 
lack of uniform journalist-source protections can no longer be remedied 
solely by providing a First Amendment testimonial privilege to 
reporters, effectively rendering the post-Branzburg reporter’s privilege 
debate moot.  
 
 13. See infra Section III.A. 
 14. See infra Section III.B. 
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I.  THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE DEBATE 
A. The Notorious Branzburg Ambiguity 
Branzburg has generally been viewed as the seminal decision on the 
reporter’s privilege question.15 This case involved the consolidation of 
three parallel cases in which three journalists sought to quash grand jury 
subpoenas compelling them to testify about information obtained while 
reporting.16 The Court framed the ultimate question of the case as a 
narrow inquiry: “whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify 
before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and 
press guaranteed by the First Amendment.”17 Justice White, writing for 
the majority, explicitly rejected the petitioners’ request for recognition 
of a federal reporter’s privilege.18 In support of this conclusion, Justice 
White argued that “the public interest in law enforcement and in 
ensuring effective grand jury proceedings” was stronger than any burden 
placed on reporters by a grand jury subpoena.19 He also cited to the 
absence of existing data indicating that there would be a “significant 
constriction of the flow of news to the public” if the Court failed to 
shield reporters from grand jury subpoenas, especially considering the 
codependent relationship between the press and its informants.20 
In contrast, Justice Stewart’s dissent criticized the majority’s 
“disturbing insensitivity” to society’s need for an independent and 
constitutionally protected press,21 stating that the Court’s decision would 
hamper the functioning of the press by causing its sources of information 
to communicate less openly.22 Instead, the dissent proposed a three-
 
 15. See Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of 
Journalists’ Confidentiality, 1795-2005, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425, 447 (2006).  
 16. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667–75 (1972). The three individual Branzburg 
cases were filed separately, but all involved the petitioners obtaining information that law 
enforcement believed could aid in preventing illegal activities: petitioner Branzburg of The 
Courier-Journal (Louisville) wrote two articles concerning drug use in Kentucky, while both 
petitioners Pappas of a Massachusetts television station and Caldwell of The New York Times 
reported on the Black Panthers. Id. 
 17. Id. at 667; see also THOMAS DIENES, LEE LEVINE & ROBERT C. LIND, 
NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW §	16.05 (3d ed. 2005). 
 18. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690. 
 19. Id. at 690–91. 
 20. Id. at 693–95 (“[T]he relationship of many informants to the press is a symbiotic one 
which is unlikely to be greatly inhibited by the threat of subpoena: quite often, such 
informants are members of a minority political or cultural group that relies heavily on the 
media to propagate its views, publicize its aims, and magnify its exposure to the public.”). 
 21. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 22. Id.; see also United States v. Caldwell, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1992) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the Court’s decision in Branzburg would force reporters to write with 
“more restrained pens”). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1314 (2017) 
1318 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
prong test that the government must satisfy before they compel a 
journalist to testify before a grand jury.23 
These seemingly straightforward opinions aside, the widespread 
confusion associated with the Branzburg decision stems from Justice 
Powell’s fifth vote. Although he joined the opinion of the majority, his 
concurrence embraced a puzzling approach to the reporter’s privilege 
issue. In his brief opinion, Justice Powell seemed to qualify the 
majority’s clear rejection of a federal reporter’s privilege: 
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the 
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the 
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to 
criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and 
societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and 
traditional way of adjudicating such questions.24 
Because Branzburg was a five-to-four decision, Justice Powell’s 
vote was crucial to achieving a majority. Consequently, Justice Powell’s 
“case-by-case basis” qualification sheds light on lower courts’ opposing 
interpretations of Branzburg: although Justice Powell technically 
concurred in the “limited nature of the Court’s holding[,]”25 some courts 
have nonetheless viewed his brief concurrence as the controlling opinion 
in this case.26 
B. Divergent Treatment of Branzburg Among Federal Courts 
One judge has noted that “Justice Powell’s concurrence and the 
subsequent appellate history have made the lessons of Branzburg about 
as clear as mud.”27 Despite the initial postulation that Branzburg would 
be highly detrimental to reporters, federal courts only recently began 
interpreting this decision as an outright rejection of a constitutional 
 
 23. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 740 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Governmental officials must, 
therefore, demonstrate that the information sought is clearly relevant to a precisely defined 
subject of governmental inquiry. They must demonstrate that it is reasonable to think the 
witness in question has that information. And they must show that there is not any means of 
obtaining the information less destructive of First Amendment liberties.” (citations omitted)). 
The three-part test articulated by Justice Stewart is analogous, but not identical, to the one 
adopted by the Fourth Circuit in LaRouche v. NBC. See LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 
1139 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[C]ourts have developed a three part test:	(1)	whether the information 
is relevant, (2)	whether the information can be obtained by alternative means, and 
(3)	whether there is a compelling interest in the information.”). 
 24. Branzburg, 480 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 25. Id. at 709. 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 523 (4th Cir. 2013) (Gregory, J., 
dissenting). 
 27. Id. 
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reporter’s privilege.28 Some circuits have held that the Branzburg 
majority, not Justice Powell’s concurrence, is the controlling precedent.29 
For example, in declining to read Justice Powell’s concurrence to 
“construct a broad, qualified newsreporters’ privilege in criminal cases,” 
the Fifth Circuit noted that “Justice Powell’s separate writing only 
emphasizes that at a certain point, the First Amendment must protect 
the press from government intrusion.”30 Historically, holdings largely 
rejecting the reporter’s privilege have been the minority approach; 
however, lower courts’ reliance upon the Branzburg majority opinion, 
rather than the concurrence, have become increasingly popular in recent 
years.31 
Other jurisdictions, however, have surprisingly viewed Branzburg 
as a plurality opinion, thereby relying on the narrowest opinion (Justice 
Powell’s concurrence) as controlling precedent.32 As explained by the 
 
 28. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 515, 553–55 (2007).  
 29. See Sterling, 724 F.3d at 495 (“By his own words, Justice Powell concurred in Justice 
White’s opinion for the majority, and he rejected the contrary view of Justice Stewart.”) 
(majority opinion); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (“[W]hatever Justice Powell specifically intended, he joined the majority. Not only did 
he join the majority in name, but because of his joinder with the rest of a majority, the Court 
reached a result that rejected First Amendment privilege not to testify before the grand jury 
for reporters	.	.	.	.”); In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2004) (“In 
Branzburg, the Supreme Court flatly rejected any notion of a general-purpose reporter’s 
privilege for confidential sources	.	.	.	. Justice Powell, who wrote separately but joined in the 
majority opinion as the necessary fifth vote, also rejected any general-purpose privilege.”); 
United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 969 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Although some courts have taken 
from Justice Powell’s concurrence a mandate to construct a broad, qualified newsreporters’ 
privilege in criminal cases, we decline to do so. Justice Powell’s separate writing only 
emphasizes that at a certain point, the First Amendment must protect the press from 
government intrusion.” (citation omitted)); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397, 400 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (“It is important to note that Justice White’s opinion is not a plurality opinion. 
Although Justice Powell wrote a separate concurrence, he also signed Justice White’s opinion, 
providing the fifth vote necessary to establish it as the majority opinion of the court.”). 
 30. Smith, 135 F.3d at 969 (emphasis added). 
 31. Papandrea, supra note 28, at 555. 
 32. See Sterling, 724 F.3d at 523 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“Given this confusion, 
appellate courts have subsequently hewed closer to Justice	Powell’s concurrence	.	.	.	than to 
the majority opinion	.	.	.	.”); In re Grand Jury 87-3 Subpoena Duces Tecum, 955 F.2d 229, 232 
(4th Cir. 1992) (applying Justice Powell’s proposed balancing test and noting that “Justice 
Powell’s opinion is the clearest explanation of how Branzburg applies to our facts”); In re 
Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 8 n.9 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Justice Powell cast the 
deciding vote in [Branzburg], and therefore his reservations are particularly important in 
understanding the decision.”); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (applying 
“[a]n approach similar to that described by Justice Powell in Branzburg” to a civil reporter’s 
privilege case); United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 357 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that this 
court had “previously adopted the formulation in the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in 
Branzburg” (citing Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715–16 (3d Cir. 1979)); Carey v. 
Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“Indeed, the Branzburg result appears to have 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1314 (2017) 
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Second Circuit, “Justice Powell cast the deciding vote in [Branzburg], 
and therefore his reservations are particularly important in 
understanding the decision.”33 Even when courts have concluded that 
Branzburg allows for some recognition of a First Amendment reporter’s 
privilege, they have disagreed on its scope. The Second Circuit, for 
example, has explicitly stated that there is “no legally-principled reason 
for drawing a distinction between civil and criminal cases” for reporter’s 
privilege purposes,34 while the First Circuit requires an additional 
balancing test between the asserted First Amendment interests and the 
criminal defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.35 To further 
complicate this debate, some circuits have refused to recognize the 
privilege solely in the specific context of grand jury proceedings, 
emphasizing their crucial role in the administration of justice.36 
C. United States v. Sterling 
In 2013, the Fourth Circuit joined other circuits in interpreting the 
challenging question that Branzburg’s ambiguity presents: Are reporters 
privileged against federal grand jury subpoenas requiring them to testify 
about their knowledge of criminal activity?37 Although this circuit had 
previously discussed the concept of a federal reporter’s privilege in civil 
cases38 and criminal cases involving nonconfidential sources,39 United 
 
been controlled by the vote of Justice Powell.”); see also 2 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON 
DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS §	14:3.2.B (4th ed. 2010) 
(“Because Justice White’s plurality opinion was rather enigmatic and Justice Powell’s was the 
pivotal fifth vote, his concurring opinion has been treated by some courts and commentators 
as authoritative.”); Papandrea, supra note 28, at 554 (“Because Justice Powell cast the 
deciding vote in Branzburg, many courts and commentators have read his concurring opinion 
as the controlling opinion in the case.”). 
 33. In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d at 8 n.9. 
 34. United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983); see also United States v. 
Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[I]nformation may only be compelled from a 
reporter claiming privilege if the party requesting the information can show that it is highly 
relevant, necessary to the proper presentation of the case, and unavailable from other 
sources.”). 
 35. United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 36. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.3d 397, 401 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that 
although the court had previously balanced conflicting interests when determining the 
existence of a reporter’s privilege in non-grand jury proceedings, they did so because “that 
case—unlike Branzburg or the present case—did not involve testimony before a grand jury”); 
Storer Commc’ns., Inc. v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[Branzburg held that] 
the first amendment accords no privilege to news reporters against appearing before a grand 
jury	.	.	.	since requiring reporters to appear and testify before state and federal grand juries 
does not impact unconstitutionally upon their ability to gather news.”). 
 37. Sterling, 724 F.3d at 482, 492. 
 38. See LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 39. See In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 851 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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States v. Sterling was the first case in which the Fourth Circuit closed the 
door on extending this protection to confidential sources in criminal 
cases.40 With Sterling, the Fourth Circuit joined other circuits that have 
selectively read the ambiguous Branzburg opinion to support divergent 
results in criminal and civil cases.41 
1.  A Divided Fourth Circuit 
The Sterling dispute stems from a book, State of War: The Secret 
History of the CIA and the Bush Administration, published in 2006 by 
The New York Times author James Risen.42 In this book, Risen revealed 
classified information regarding a Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) 
operation referred to by the Fourth Circuit as “Classified Program No. 
1.”43 Although Risen did not reveal his sources for the classified 
material, extensive evidence led the government to believe that ex-CIA 
agent Jeffrey Sterling was Risen’s informant; the most notable evidence 
was the exchange of nineteen phone calls between The New York Times 
office and Sterling’s house and twenty-seven emails between Risen and 
Sterling.44 
 
 40. Sterling, 724 F.3d at 530 (Gregory, J., dissenting). 
 41. The D.C. Circuit, for example, upheld the application of a qualified First Amendment 
reporter’s privilege in the civil context, where the reporter was neither a party to the claims 
nor protecting himself from liability, see Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714–15 (D.C. Cir. 
1981), but then subsequently refused to do the same in a criminal case, specifically noting that 
“[e]ven if Zerilli states the law applicable to civil cases, this is not a civil case[,]” In re Judith 
Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit applied a qualified 
privilege to protect an “investigative author” from testifying in a defamation suit about 
confidential interviews he conducted with the defendant, Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1290–
92 (9th Cir. 1992), yet also upheld a criminal contempt order against a newsman who refused 
to reveal his confidential sources to a trial judge attempting to discover who had violated his 
publicity order in the highly publicized Charles Manson murder trial, Farr v. Pitchess, 522 
F.2d 464, 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 42. Sterling, 724 F.3d at 490; see also JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006). 
 43. Sterling, 724 F.3d at 490. 
 44. Id. at 489–90. The government based its conclusion off Sterling’s prior interactions 
with the CIA and Risen. Id. at 488–90. While working for the CIA in 1998, Sterling’s 
assignment was Classified Program No. 1, but he was reassigned only two years later. Id. at 
488. Soon after Sterling’s reassignment, Risen published two articles in The New York Times 
discussing the CIA, one of which explicitly named Sterling as his source. Id. at 488–89; James 
Risen, A Nation Challenged: The Intelligence Agency; Secret C.I.A. Site in New York Was 
Destroyed on Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/04/us
/nation-challenged-intelligence-agency-secret-cia-site-new-york-was-destroyed.html [https://perma
.cc/SA89-WZBQ]; James Risen, Fired by C.I.A., He Says Agency Practiced Bias, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 2, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/02/us/fired-by-cia-he-says-agency-practiced-
bias.html [https://perma.cc/M5SK-UY52]. In 2003, Sterling informed the CIA that he had 
classified information concerning Classified Program No. 1 and that he intended to publish a 
story about it in The New York Times. Sterling, 724 F.3d at 489. In addition to the phone calls 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1314 (2017) 
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In May of 2011, after Sterling had been indicted by the grand jury 
on six counts of unauthorized retention and communication of national 
defense information,45 the government issued a subpoena seeking 
Risen’s testimony regarding his source for the classified CIA 
information published in State of War.46 Risen moved to quash the 
subpoena, asserting that he was “protected from compelled testimony by 
the First Amendment or, in the alternative, by a federal common-law 
reporter’s privilege.”47 The district court applied the three-part 
reporter’s privilege test previously used by the Fourth Circuit in the civil 
case LaRouche v. NBC.48 This application ultimately lead to a ruling in 
favor of Risen upon a finding that the government had failed to satisfy 
two out of the three requirements.49 
On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision and held that Branzburg precluded the recognition of a First 
Amendment reporter’s privilege in criminal cases.50 The first line of 
Judge Traxler’s stark majority opinion states: “There is no First 
Amendment testimonial privilege, absolute or qualified, that protects a 
reporter from being compelled to testify	.	.	.	in criminal proceedings.”51 
Relying on Branzburg, the majority noted that the “controlling 
authority is clear[,]”52 since the Supreme Court “in no uncertain terms” 
rejected the idea of providing special First Amendment protection to 
reporters.53 In rejecting the dissent’s “strained reading” of Justice 
Powell’s concurrence as a “tacit endorsement of Justice Stewart’s 
dissenting opinion,” Judge Traxler instead concluded that “Justice 
Powell’s concurrence expresses no disagreement with the majority’s 
 
and emails exchanged between Risen and Sterling, there were also two classified meetings at 
which Sterling was the only common attendee. See id. at 489–90. 
 45. Sterling, 724 F.3d at 490. Sterling was also indicted by the grand jury for one count of 
unlawful retention of national defense information, one count of mail fraud, one count of 
unauthorized conveyance of government property, and one count of obstruction of justice. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986). According to this test, the court considers “(1) whether 
the information is relevant, (2) whether the information can be obtained by alternative means, 
and (3) whether there is a compelling interest in the information” before mandating 
disclosure. Id. at 1139 (citing Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, modified, 628 
F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1980)).  
 49. See Sterling, 724 F.3d at 491. (“The district court held that	.	.	.	the Government had 
failed to demonstrate that the information was unavailable from other means and that it had a 
compelling interest in presenting it to the jury.”). 
 50. Id. at 492, 499. 
 51. Id. at 492. 
 52. Id. at 494. 
 53. Id. at 492 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1146 
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
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determination that reporters are entitled to no special privilege[.]”54 
Moreover, despite the Fourth Circuit’s prior reliance upon Branzburg in 
LaRouche, the Sterling majority refused to apply this test in the criminal 
context, specifically noting that LaRouche “offers no authority for us to 
recognize a First Amendment reporter’s privilege in this criminal 
proceeding.”55 
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Gregory argued that the Branzburg 
opinion actually did allow for the recognition of a qualified reporter’s 
privilege and that prior Fourth Circuit precedent also supports the 
application of this privilege in criminal cases “given the right 
circumstances.”56 Rather than viewing Justice Powell’s concurrence as 
ancillary to the majority opinion, Judge Gregory advocated for the 
adoption of a qualified privilege to be evaluated by the three-part 
LaRouche test, with the addition of two factors for cases involving 
national security issues.57 In direct opposition to the majority, Judge 
Gregory specifically noted that this view does “not depart from 
established precedent, to the contrary, it adheres to Justice Powell’s 
concurrence in Branzburg[.]”58 
2.  The Fate of James Risen and Jeffrey Sterling 
On January 12, 2015—nearly two years after the Fourth Circuit 
rendered its decision—then-Attorney General Eric Holder announced 
he was withdrawing the grand jury subpoena issued against James Risen, 
thereby ending the seven-year battle over the confidential State of War 
sources.59 This decision was announced several months after the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied Risen’s request for review60 but mere days after 
 
 54. Id. at 495 (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. at 497.  
 56. Id. at 523–24 (Gregory, J., dissenting). Judge Gregory cited to a prior Fourth Circuit 
case as a basis for this assertion, noting that “although the reporter’s privilege was not 
recognized in ‘the circumstances of this case,’ it is clear to me that we have acknowledged that 
a reporter’s privilege attaches in criminal proceedings given the right circumstances.” Id. at 
524 (quoting In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 854 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
 57. Id. at 524–25 (“[I]n cases involving questions of national security, if the three-part 
LaRouche test is satisfied in favor of the reporter’s privilege, I would require consideration of 
two additional factors: the harm caused by the public dissemination of the information, and 
the newsworthiness of the information conveyed.”).  
 58. Id. at 525. 
 59. United States’ Motion in Limine to Exclude James Risen as an Unavailable Witness 
at 1, United States v. Sterling, 818 F. Supp. 2d 945 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 1:10cr485), 2015 WL 
333047 [hereinafter Motion in Limine]; Matt Apuzzo, Times Reporter Will Not Be Called to 
Testify in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/us/times-
reporter-james-risen-will-not-be-called-to-testify-in-leak-case-lawyers-say.html [https://perma.cc
/48TZ-H69K]. 
 60. United States v. Sterling, 134 S. Ct. 2696 (2014) (denying certiorari review). 
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The New York Times journalist unapologetically refused to testify 
during a pretrial hearing.61 Not only did Risen withhold any information 
he had at the hearing, he also stated that he would abstain from 
answering questions at trial.62 Because such testimony “would simply 
frustrate the truth-seeking function of the trial[,]” the government filed a 
motion in limine to exclude Risen as an unavailable witness.63 
Jeffrey Sterling, however, was not as lucky as his alleged confidant. 
After a seemingly endless legal feud, on January 26, 2015, Jeffrey 
Sterling was found guilty on ten counts of unauthorized disclosure of 
national defense information.64 In May of 2015, Sterling was sentenced 
to forty-two months in prison,65 notwithstanding the prosecution’s 
suggested sentence of 235 to 293 months.66 
II.  THE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM INCONSISTENCY AND 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. Concerns with Conflicting Branzburg Interpretations 
As exemplified by the Sterling controversy, the perpetual 
inconsistency stemming from Branzburg has daunting repercussions for 
the fair treatment of reporters and implicates federalism concerns. On a 
fundamental level, conflicting Branzburg interpretations lead to 
inconsistent treatment and punishment of reporters. Because of these 
drastic jurisdictional variations, a reporter’s legal fate may be entirely 
dependent on where the reporter resides or chooses to conduct 
interviews.67 This widely varying treatment of reporters appears to 
create a lose-lose situation for reporters wishing to publish content 
 
 61. Matt Apuzzo, Defiant on Witness Stand, Times Reporter Says Little, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/us/james-risen-in-tense-testimony-refuses-to-
offer-clues-on-sources.html [https://perma.cc/X6WN-LVN2]. The prosecution’s stated 
purpose of the hearing was “to allow the parties and the Court an opportunity to see which 
questions, if any, Mr. Risen would answer and to provide sufficient time to resolve any 
disputes	.	.	.	.” Motion in Limine, supra note 59, at 1. 
 62. Motion in Limine, supra note 59, at 1. 
 63. Id. at 2. 
 64. Verdict Form at 1–3, Sterling, 818 F. Supp. 2d 945 (No. 1:10cr485), 2015 WL 798700. 
 65. Steven Nelson, Jeffrey Sterling Sentenced to 42 Months for Talking to Reporter, U.S. 
NEWS (May 11, 2015, 5:18 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/05/11/jeffrey-
sterling-sentenced-to-42-months-for-talking-to-reporter [https://perma.cc/7LKK-GXFK]. 
 66. United States’ Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 6, Sterling, 818 F. Supp. 2d 945 
(No. 1:10cr485), 2015 WL 1905995. 
 67. See Ryan C. Stevens, Keeping the News Domestic: Why a Toxic Environment for the 
American Press and Ready Access to Foreign Media Organizations Like Wikileaks Compel the 
Rapid Adoption of a Federal Reporters’ Privilege, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1474–75 (2015) 
(“These inconsistencies subject a reporter’s ability to gather news to vastly different legal 
standards depending on the district where she resides.”). 
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exposing criminal activity, especially those situated in jurisdictions that 
have not expressly adopted or rejected a reporter’s privilege in criminal 
cases: those journalists must either publish the criminal behavior and 
take the risk of a court declining the privilege or avoid that risk by 
choosing to forgo publication altogether. 
But the practical effect of this legal inconsistency on the livelihood 
of reporters facing criminal subpoenas is not limited to their professional 
careers or reputations. The highly publicized D.C. Circuit case In re 
Judith Miller68 exemplifies what is truly at stake for reporters in these 
cases. While the case was on appeal, The New York Times journalist 
Judith Miller spent eighty-five days in jail for her continued refusal to 
reveal the identity of her confidential source.69 Similarly, a reporter for 
The Los Angeles Herald Examiner was held in contempt for forty-six 
days after failing to disclose his source for leaked testimony from the 
Charles Manson murder trial.70 And in 2007, video blogger Josh Wolf 
became the “longest-jailed journalist” to date after he refused to comply 
with a subpoena that ordered him to testify about criminal events that 
took place during a San Francisco protest.71 Thus, even though prison 
sentences for reporters are not particularly commonplace,72 these 
examples nonetheless reaffirm that reporters who fail to disclose a 
confidential source can face incarceration in many jurisdictions. 
Additionally, the division among federal jurisdictions regarding 
protections for journalists has been criticized by many states for its 
deleterious effect on state shield laws.73 When Branzburg was decided, 
the majority of states did not provide statutory protection for 
reporters.74 Now, over forty years later, nearly all states provide some 
form of a qualified reporter’s privilege, either through judicial or 
 
 68. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 69. See RUANE, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that Miller spent eighty-five days in jail for 
refusing to cooperate in a grand jury investigation relating to the leak of the identity of an 
undercover CIA agent). 
 70. See Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1975); Jack Jones, Reporter Farr 
Dies; Went to Jail to Protect Sources, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-
03-06/local/me-5024_1_shield-law [https://perma.cc/26W3-XH6Z]. 
 71. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 F. App’x 430, 431–32 (9th Cir. 
2006); Elizabeth Soja, Behind Bars: Josh Wolf has Become the Longest-Jailed Journalist in 
Recent American History, 31 NEWS MEDIA & L. 14, 14 (2007) (noting that on February 6, 
2007, Wolf had been in jail for 169 days). 
 72. See generally Paying the Price: A Recent Census of Reporters Jailed or Fined for 
Refusing to Testify, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org
/jailed-journalists [https://perma.cc/BV9H-6CY8] (providing an updated list of all known 
jailings and finings of reporters). 
 73. James Thomas Tucker & Stephen Wermiel, Enacting A Reasonable Federal Shield 
Law: A Reply to Professors Clymer and Eliason, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1310 (2008).  
 74. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 (1972). 
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legislative action.75 This, however, has given rise to an entirely separate 
conflict: if a federal proceeding necessitates the disclosure of a 
confidential news source, the laws governing the state in which the 
publication occurred are wholly irrelevant.76 Essentially, even if the 
publication occurs in a state that provides complete protection for all 
confidential reporter-source communications, that protection is not 
applicable in federal court.77 
The inconsistency between federal and state laws within the same 
jurisdiction serves to undermine the interests the states that have 
enacted shield laws sought to protect.78 As noted by the attorneys 
general of thirty-four states and the District of Columbia, 
A federal policy that allows journalists to be imprisoned for 
engaging in the same conduct that these State privileges 
encourage and protect “buck[s] file (sic) clear policy of virtually 
all states,” and undermines both the purpose of the shield laws, 
and the policy determinations of the State courts and legislatures 
that adopted them.79 
Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has noted in its prior discussion of the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege that “any State’s promise of 
confidentiality would have little value if the patient were aware that the 
privilege would not be honored in a federal court.”80 And considering 
the near-uniform acknowledgment of the importance of confidential 
reporter-source communications among the states, the lack of 
corresponding federal protection appears to have “undercut the State 
shield laws just as much as the absence of a federal privilege.”81 
 
 75. Since Branzburg made clear that states were free to fashion their own protections for 
reporters, id. at 706, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have done so by enacting 
“shield statutes[,]” and another sixteen states have recognized a reporter’s privilege judicially, 
see HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32806, JOURNALISTS’ PRIVILEGE TO 
WITHHOLD INFORMATION IN JUDICIAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS: STATE SHIELD 
STATUTES 1 (2007). 
 76. See FED. R. EVID. 1101. 
 77. See id. For a detailed analysis of the conflicting state and federal laws, see generally 
Theodore Campagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and Federal Criminal 
Proceedings: The Rule 501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 478–91 (2002–2003) (concluding that 
shield laws in thirty-eight states most likely have at least some conflict with their respective 
federal circuit laws).  
 78. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Okla. et al. in Support of Petitioners, Miller v. 
United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005) (Nos. 04-1507, 04-1508), 2005 WL 1317523, at *2–3.  
 79. Id. at *2–3 (citation omitted). 
 80. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996). 
 81. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Okla. et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 
78, at *3. 
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B. Proposed Solutions 
1. Federal Shield Law 
Despite leaving Congress the freedom to “fashion standards and 
rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil 
discerned[,]”82 Congress has thus far failed to heed the Court’s advice 
and enact a law protecting journalists from federal subpoenas. 
According to several scholars that have examined Congress’s various 
attempts to create a federal shield law: 
For over three decades, Congress considered numerous federal 
reporters’ shield bills.	.	.	. All told, approximately one hundred 
bills to create a shield law were introduced by 1978. None of the 
bills made it to a floor vote. Despite the acknowledged need for 
congressional action, no federal reporters’ shield law had been 
enacted for thirty-five years after Branzburg.83 
More recently, in 2007 and 2009, members of Congress proposed 
several bills that would have created a federal reporter’s privilege.84 
Although the passage of a federal shield law in 2007 appeared 
“inevitable” due to the high approval margin in the House of 
Representatives,85 the full Senate never voted on these bills.86 Again in 
2013, analogous acts were introduced in both the House and the Senate 
but neither was passed.87 Moreover, Congress’s inability to enact a 
federal shield law is not the only problem. While the reaction from the 
media has not been entirely negative,88 the proposed shield laws have 
nonetheless been criticized for their narrow definition of what should 
constitute a “journalist” subject to the proffered protections.89 The 
proposals have also been questioned in light of a proposed exception 
 
 82. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). 
 83. Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 73, at 1310–11. 
 84. See RUANE, supra note 4, at 4, 9.  
 85. Tucker & Wermiel, supra note 73, at 1293–94. 
 86. See RUANE, supra note 4, at Summary, 4.  
 87. S. 987, 113th Congress (2013); H.R. 1962, 113th Congress (2013). 
 88. Editorial Board, A Shield Law Is Necessary to Protect U.S. Journalists, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 22, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-shield-law-is-necessary-to-
protect-us-journalists/2013/09/22/a3449104-20af-11e3-966c-9c4293c47ebe_story.html [https://
perma.cc/2V7P-G6KW] (noting that “the [proposed] bill would guarantee protections to a 
wide range of people who meet certain tell-tale characteristics” and would “also build 
flexibility into the system to recognize those who don’t fit neatly into the mold”). 
 89. See Lauren J. Russell, Comment, Shielding the Media: In an Age of Bloggers, 
Tweeters, and Leakers, Will Congress Succeed in Defining the Term “Journalist” and in 
Passing a Long-Sought Federal Shield Act?, 93 OR. L. REV. 193, 219 (2014) (noting that the 
employment requirement for journalists is overly restrictive and excludes nontraditional 
media). 
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allowing journalists to still be subpoenaed if it means national security is 
at risk.90 
2. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
Another potential solution to the Branzburg inconsistency stems 
from Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides that “[t]he common 
law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and 
experience—governs a claim of privilege” unless provided otherwise by 
the Constitution, a federal statute, or the Supreme Court.91 According to 
the Rule’s commentary, the original text of Rule 501 delineated nine 
specific privileges that the federal courts would have been required to 
recognize.92 In rejecting this enumerated list, Congress “left the law of 
privileges in its present state and further provided that privileges shall 
continue to be developed by the courts	.	.	.	in the light of reason and 
experience.”93 Several years after this Rule’s creation, the Supreme 
Court recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule 501.94 
Thus, Rule 501 allows courts to develop new privileges.95 
As exemplified through the Sterling majority’s discussion of Rule 
501,96 when taken independently, this rule does very little to remedy the 
inconsistent treatment of Branzburg. Of course, an essential aspect of 
solving this issue is for the Court to actually grant certiorari over a 
federal reporter’s privilege case—something it does not appear keen on 
doing, based on its recent denials of certiorari in high-profile cases like 
In re Judith Miller97 and Sterling.98 
 
 90. See Trevor Timm, White House Shield Bill Could Actually Make It Easier For the 
Government to Get Journalists’ Sources, FREEDOM PRESS FOUND. (May 16, 2013), https://
freedom.press/news-advocacy/white-house-shield-bill-could-actually-make-it-easier-for-the-
government-to-get-journalists-sources/ [https://perma.cc/MJ86-CRRJ] (noting that this 
proposed exception is problematic because leak investigations almost always implicate 
national security concerns, and thus the actual protection the law would provide to journalists 
would be minimal). 
 91. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 92. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1996). 
 95. See id. at 8; United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 501 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 96. Judge Traxler argued that the Supreme Court’s use of Rule 501 in prior cases “does 
not authorize [the court] to ignore Branzburg or support [the] recognition of a common-law 
reporter-source privilege” in Sterling. Sterling, 724 F.3d at 501. While the majority accepted 
that previous use of Rule 501 by the Supreme Court indicates that the Court might rule 
differently on the common-law privilege issue in the future, the Fourth Circuit was “not at 
liberty to take that critical step.” Id. 
 97. Miller v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005) (denying certiorari). 
 98. Risen v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2696 (2014) (denying certiorari). 
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3. Department of Justice Guidelines 
 In spite of the congressional and judicial failure to solidify an 
unambiguous rule regarding federal reporter subpoenas, the executive 
branch has been comparatively successful. In 1970, the DOJ announced 
guidelines governing the issuance of federal subpoenas with the stated 
intent of protecting the news media from law enforcement procedures 
“that might unreasonably impair newsgathering activities.”99 Pursuant to 
these guidelines, subpoenas targeted at nonconsenting reporters require 
prior approval from the attorney general, and should only be authorized 
after “all reasonable alternative attempts have been made to obtain the 
information from alternative sources[,]” the DOJ has pursued 
negotiations with the reporter, and the target of the subpoena has been 
notified.100 Regarding the content of the targeted information, these 
guidelines note that obtaining “peripheral, nonessential, or speculative 
information” is not a proper basis for the issuance of a subpoena in 
either the criminal or civil context.101 
 Yet, despite these provisions, this policy is a guideline, rather than a 
law. These guidelines were created only to advise DOJ prosecutors 
about when to pursue reporters in leak investigations, not to establish a 
compulsory subpoena process for prosecutors.102 Because the guidelines 
are merely instructive rather than binding, a reporter like Risen cannot 
argue that the DOJ failed to follow the guidelines in a motion to quash a 
subpoena.103 This is a problem, not only because reporters like Risen are 
unable to require enforcement of such guidelines, but also because 
reporters like Risen do not know when the guidelines will be followed 
and when they will not. Additionally, these guidelines only apply to 
subpoenas sought by the DOJ, which means they do not apply to special 
 
 99. 28 C.F.R. §	50.10(a)(1) (2016); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 n.41 (1972). 
 100. See §	50.10(a)(3). 
 101. Id. §	50.10(c)(4). 
 102. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707 n.41; Grant Penrod, A Problem of Interpretation, 
NEWS MEDIA & L., Fall 2004, at 9 (“For the most part, [the guidelines] are considered purely 
advisory, and the Department of Justice can enforce them—or not enforce them—as it sees 
fit.”); Sari Horwitz, Holder Tightens Investigators’ Guidelines in Cases Involving News Media, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/holder-
tightens-investigators-guidelines-in-cases-involving-news-media/2015/01/14/1f4065d6-9c0f-11e4-
96cc-e858eba91ced_story.html [https://perma.cc/MQ4Y-B2P2]. 
 103. See 28 C.F.R. §	50.10(j) (“This policy is not intended to, and does not, create any right 
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the 
United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any 
other person.”); Penrod, supra note 102, at 4 (“The biggest obstacle to using the Department 
of Justice guidelines to oppose subpoenas is that courts do not enforce the guidelines as 
law.”). 
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prosecutors.104 Consequently, the DOJ policy has been criticized on 
grounds that it is both insufficient in scope and unenforceable in 
practice, reinforcing existing concerns about the unpredictable and 
inconsistent contours of the reporter’s privilege.105 
Even before the Sterling controversy, the Obama administration’s 
reputation for harshly prosecuting leakers seemed to only exacerbate 
the growing concerns over the leniency of these guidelines. Despite 
President Obama’s promise to “establish a system of transparency,”106 
the DOJ prosecuted eight leakers during his tenure—a shocking 
number, considering only three total leakers had ever been prosecuted 
before President Obama took office.107 In addition to the sheer volume 
of prosecutions, inconsistent sentencing in recent whistleblower cases 
has also been a subject of scrutiny. While high-ranking officials have 
received a slap on the wrist for disclosing confidential information, 
lower-ranking officials have been more severely punished for 
committing identical offenses.108 
 
 104. In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 43–44, 44 n.3 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he 
regulations are not themselves binding on the special prosecutor” because “a special 
prosecutor is not a member of the Justice Department”). 
 105. See Penrod, supra note 102, at 4, 5–7.  
 106. Open Government Initiative, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/open 
[https://perma.cc/JK3U-C94B]. 
 107. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security 
Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 454–55 (2014). Two of these cases 
(including Sterling’s) were inherited from the Bush administration, so it may be argued that 
these are not “his” prosecutions. Jon Greenberg, CNN’s Tapper: Obama Has Used Espionage 
Act More Than All Previous Administrations, PUNDITFACT (Jan. 10, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://
www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/jan/10/jake-tapper/cnns-tapper-obama-has-used-
espionage-act-more-all-/ [https://perma.cc/XQ7B-ZC23]; Peter Maass, The Whistleblower’s 
Tale: How Jeffrey Sterling Took on the CIA—and Lost Everything, INTERCEPT (June 18, 
2015, 3:06 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/06/18/jeffrey-sterling-took-on-the-cia-and-lost-
everything/ [https://perma.cc/SG3K-2DW3]. 
 108. Peter Maass, Petraeus Plea Deal Reveals Two-Tier Justice System for Leaks, 
INTERCEPT (Mar. 3, 2015, 5:30 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/03/03/petraeus-plea-deal-
reveals-two-tier-justice-system-leaks/ [https://perma.cc/GPB6-93AS]. In March of 2015, 
former CIA director David Petraeus pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor, unauthorized 
removal and retention of classified information. Id. According to his plea deal, Petraeus kept 
records of highly sensitive military and intelligence information while leading forces in 
Afghanistan and lent them to his girlfriend when he returned from his deployment. Id. 
Petraeus did not serve any jail time, allowing him to “focus on his lucrative post-government 
career	as a partner in a	private equity	firm and a worldwide speaker on national security 
issues.” Michael Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, Petraeus Reaches Plea Deal Over Giving Classified 
Data to His Lover, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/us/petraeus-
plea-deal-over-giving-classified-data-to-lover.html [https://perma.cc/MR4G-UY4A]. In contrast, 
Stephen Kim, a former State Department official, pleaded guilty to the exact same offense as 
Petraeus, but received a thirteen-month prison sentence. Maass, supra. Unlike Petraeus, Kim 
had merely discussed a classified report with Fox News reporter James Rosen. Id. Similarly, 
neither former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales nor ex-CIA director John Deutch were 
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On January 14, 2015—two days after his decision to forgo 
compelling Risen’s testimony—then-Attorney General Holder 
announced expanded revisions of DOJ’s policy regarding obtaining 
information from, or records of, members of the media.109 One change in 
particular appeared to have the most drastic potential impact. The new 
guidelines substituted the term “ordinary newsgathering activities” with 
simply “newsgathering activities.”110 Before the change, the attorney 
general only had to authorize attempts by DOJ investigators to obtain 
information from journalists as it pertained to “ordinary newsgathering 
activities[.]”111 This possibly gave DOJ investigators too much discretion 
to determine what constituted “ordinary newsgathering activities” and 
thus what situations required the approval of the attorney general.112 
That is, if the investigators thought it would be difficult to obtain 
attorney general approval, they could classify the “newsgathering 
activity” as “non-ordinary,” and then would not need attorney general 
approval. The 2015 revision eliminated this problem by requiring the 
attorney general to authorize subpoenas for investigations concerning all 
newsgathering activities.113  
While the guideline revisions—at least when coupled with the 
decision not to subpoena Risen—were seen by some news organizations 
as a “step in the right direction[,]”114 the actual impact of these efforts on 
the newsgathering process is far from certain. First, although the 
revisions seem to indicate a willingness to compromise in the future, 
these changes do not remedy the enforceability issues or loopholes that 
have previously been criticized as the most problematic aspects of these 
guidelines.115 The guidelines themselves are still not legally binding on 
the government, they still do not apply to special prosecutors, and their 
scope still does not extend beyond judicial subpoena authorization. 
 
charged for keeping classified government information in their homes, while Donald 
Sachtleben, a former FBI bomb technician, was sentenced to nearly four years for discussing 
classified information with The Associated Press. Schmidt & Apuzzo, supra. 
 109. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to All Department 
Employees (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/file/317831/download [https://perma.cc
/AE5M-XYDL] [hereinafter Updated DOJ Policy]. The Attorney General deemed the 
revisions that he had issued in early 2014 unsatisfactory based on comments from federal 
prosecutors and news media representatives. Id.  
 110. See id; Horwitz, supra note 102.  
 111. See Updated DOJ Policy, supra note 109. 
 112. See Horwitz, supra note 102. 
 113. See Updated DOJ Policy, supra note 109; see also Horwitz, supra note 102. 
 114. See Horwitz, supra note 102 (quoting Steve Coll, dean of the Columbia University 
Graduate School of Journalism). 
 115. See supra text accompanying note 105. 
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Second, because the attorney general must approve the subpoenas, 
unless subsequent attorneys general share former Attorney General 
Holder’s desire to protect the media’s role in ensuring the free flow of 
information, these changes will ultimately be futile. This concern is 
especially justified by Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s116 outspoken 
opposition to the passage of federal shield laws. In 2009, Sessions 
reportedly “stonewalled” the passage of a federal shield law,117 and in 
2013, he was as “obstructionist as possible” to a federal shield law’s 
passage.118 While Sessions’s opinions on a federal shield law are not 
necessarily dispositive of his willingness or desire to subpoena reporters, 
his vehement opposition to increased protections for journalists is 
nonetheless a negative sign for future DOJ guideline revisions. 
III.  DEVELOPMENTS THAT RENDER A FEDERAL REPORTER’S 
PRIVILEGE STANDARD FUTILE 
While the creation of a uniform federal reporter’s privilege 
standard could theoretically provide for more consistent treatment of 
reporters among federal jurisdictions, recent developments indicate that 
this is no longer a practical solution to the longstanding federal 
reporter’s privilege debate. Specifically, the increased accessibility of 
digital communications between reporters and their confidential sources 
due to technological advances, along with the widespread use of NSLs to 
gather highly-personal information without a subpoena, indicate that the 
issues stemming from the lack of uniform protection for reporters and 
journalists are no longer rooted in the adoption or rejection of a 
testimonial privilege.  
Rather, this Part argues that the ease with which the federal 
government can obtain the identity of sources of confidential 
information, regardless of whether the reporter is granted special 
testimonial protection, should now be considered the central concern of 
the reporter’s privilege debate. First, advances in surveillance 
technology have given the government the means to investigate and 
 
 116. See How Senators Voted on Jeff Sessions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/08/us/politics/jeff-sessions-confirmation-vote.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/RU2Z-34JH]. 
 117. Cristina Abello, Progress on Shield Bill Slows in Senate Judiciary Committee, 
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indict whistleblowers such as Sterling, even without the reporter’s 
testimony, through their tracking of online reporter-source 
communications. Second, the secret FBI rules recently leaked by The 
Intercept indicate that the government may have the authority to bypass 
the judicial and attorney general subpoena approval processes 
altogether through the issuance of a NSL, thereby rendering any 
protection against compelled testimony an inapplicable solution. Any 
argument in favor of a reporter’s privilege that relies on its purported 
necessity must take these issues into account. 
A. Advances in Surveillance Technology 
As evidenced by the ten-count indictment of Jeffrey Sterling, 
technological advances have given the government the means to detect 
and locate alleged whistleblowers without the reporter ever taking the 
stand, thereby rendering the subpoena a less necessary tool for 
ascertaining the identity of newsgathering sources. As Judge Gregory 
emphasized in his Sterling dissent, there was extensive circumstantial 
evidence indicating that classified information was discussed between 
Risen and Sterling.119 After discussing the magnitude of this evidence, 
Judge Gregory concluded that the government’s investigations “yielded 
multiple evidentiary avenues that	.	.	.	may be used to establish what the 
Government sought to establish solely with testimony from Risen—that 
Sterling leaked classified information, rendering Risen’s testimony 
regarding his confidential sources superfluous.”120 Two of these 
“evidentiary avenues” were the digital footprints between the two men, 
including phone records indicating that Sterling and Risen called each 
other seven times between February 27 and March 31, 2003,121 as well as 
emails obtained through a forensic analysis of Sterling’s computer 
referencing meetings and shared information.122 Beyond these 
communications, the government was also able to obtain Risen’s 
 
 119. United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 526–27 (4th Cir. 2013) (Gregory, J., 
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 120. Id. at 527. 
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personal credit reports, credit card records, bank records, and even 
airline travel records.123 
Even in the face of this undisputedly immense forensic evidence 
record, the government maintained that the information provided by 
Risen’s testimony was “unavailable from other sources” and that the 
copious amount of circumstantial evidence was not a sufficient proxy for 
his direct testimony.124 When viewed in light of Sterling’s conviction, 
however, the falsity of this contention is plain. Even without a subpoena, 
the government was clearly able to use emails, phone records, and other 
electronically obtained evidence to connect Sterling to the disclosure of 
the classified State of War information. 
The conviction in Sterling demonstrates the substantial impact that 
recent advances in technology––specifically surveillance techniques, 
such as the forensic analysis used on Risen’s computer––have on the 
reporter’s privilege debate. Although technological advancements have 
indeed simplified the job of a reporter, this is not without cost. 
Reporters and the government officials who serve as their confidential 
sources are increasingly leaving trails through their emails, cellphone 
records, credit card, and bank information.125 Additionally, as 
exemplified through the personal investigations of Risen, the scope of 
these government investigations is no longer limited to work-related 
information; the DOJ has extended its whistleblower searches into the 
private lives of reporters, seizing home phone and cellphone records.126 
The increased accessibility of this information makes it more likely that 
the government will succeed in actually convicting the alleged 
whistleblower.127 As explained by a spokesperson for then-Attorney 
General Eric Holder, many cases prosecuted under President Obama’s 
administration “were easier to prosecute” because of the availability of 
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“electronic evidence,” compared to prior cases in which “you needed to 
have the leaker admit [to whistleblowing]	.	.	.	or the reporter to testify 
about it[.]”128 
These technological advancements implicate the identical concerns 
voiced by proponents of the reporter’s privilege: revealing and 
prosecuting sources of confidential information will have a chilling effect 
on the free flow of all information, confidential or not. According to 
several journalists, these adverse effects are far from speculative. Some 
government officials are reportedly “reluctant to discuss even 
unclassified information with [journalists] because they fear that leak 
investigations and government surveillance make it more difficult for 
reporters to protect them as sources.”129 As explained by another 
reporter, this fear is bolstered by the fact that “[t]here’s a gray zone 
between classified and unclassified information, and most sources were 
in that gray zone. Sources are now afraid to enter that gray zone.”130 
These chilling effects are exacerbated even further in cases like 
Sterling’s, where the government searches personal communications and 
records.131 And surely the lengthy prison sentences issued to mid-level 
agents such as Sterling132 strongly reinforce the desire for sources to 
remain silent, rather than jeopardize their entire livelihoods and sense of 
privacy. 
Of course, not all communications between confidential sources 
and reporters happen electronically, and there are various methods 
available to reporters that allow these communications to remain 
private.133 These alternative newsgathering techniques, however, 
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substantially inhibit the journalistic process. In a report conducted by 
Human Rights Watch, many journalists noted how they are now forced 
to rely on “burdensome and costly measures” to protect their sources, 
such as using burner phones, implementing expensive encryption 
techniques, and meeting face-to-face with their sources.134 These 
methods not only impose a large financial burden on reporters, but also 
require them to expend a significant amount of time—time that would 
otherwise be devoted to the newsgathering and reporting processes—
limiting the government’s ability to track their confidential 
communications. This is especially true in the case of face-to-face 
communications, which are not a realistic option for those who cannot 
afford frequent, long-distance travel.135 Moreover, actually locating the 
source is often difficult, since some are incredibly reluctant to initially 
disclose their identities to reporters.136 In sum, although there are 
alternatives to leaving an electronic trail, they are neither conducive to 
effective journalism, nor feasible for many reporters. 
B. National Security Letters 
A second indication that reporter subpoenas are becoming 
increasingly irrelevant stems from the recent exposure of classified FBI 
rules for issuing NSLs to telephone companies for records of reporters. 
NSLs are controversial tools137 that permit the FBI to obtain information 
from companies about its consumers, without having to first obtain 
judicial approval or give notice to the targeted consumer, if that 
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information is relevant to a national security investigation.138 Telephone, 
banking, and credit card records, along with email subscriber 
information, are the most common types of private data gathered by the 
FBI through these tools.139 Moreover, targets of these FBI orders are 
sometimes precluded from divulging any details about the NSL issued 
against them—including the fact that one has even been filed—because 
of the gag orders that the FBI has the power to issue through the NSL.140 
While NSLs were originally created to protect the privacy of U.S. 
citizens, they are now considered to be a crucial tool in the government’s 
domestic fight against terrorism.141 
Even before the release of the secret rules governing telephone 
companies’ records of reporters, the FBI’s use of NSLs in this context 
has been publicly challenged in recent years. In 2013, an unnamed 
telecommunications company filed a petition in a federal district court 
to set aside an NSL and the accompanying gag order that had been 
issued on the theory that the gag order was unconstitutional.142 Although 
the district court initially determined the contested NSL provisions 
suffered from “significant constitutional infirmities,”143 this holding was 
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set aside in March of 2016 after a subsequent modification of the law.144 
Additionally, in July of 2015, after the DOJ confirmed the existence of 
secret NSL rules, the Freedom of the Press Foundation filed a Freedom 
of Information Act lawsuit against the DOJ demanding that the secret 
NSL rules be released.145 
The release of secret FBI guidelines governing the use of NSLs to 
acquire information about reporters’ telephone records has only 
exacerbated this ongoing controversy. In June of 2016, The Intercept 
released copies of the confidential NSL rules, which reveal the FBI’s 
sparse requirements for the issuance of these tools in the context of 
gathering information from the media.146 According to the leaked rules, 
NSLs that are issued with the purpose of targeting a journalist’s records 
“to identify confidential news media sources” require (on top of the 
general NSL approval requirements) the additional approval of the FBI 
general counsel, the FBI executive assistant director, and the DOJ 
assistant attorney general for the National Security Division.147 
Essentially, these guidelines appear to give the FBI the power to 
conduct extensive, personal surveillance over reporters without judicial 
oversight, notice to the organization or specific journalist being targeted, 
approval from the attorney general, or any initial attempt to obtain this 
private information through other means, so long as these additional 
signoffs are received. Moreover, if the NSL is seeking records of 
nonmedia individuals, but the targeted information has a likely chance 
of revealing communications with a news organization, only the 
approval of the general counsel and executive assistant is needed—and 
thus, the DOJ’s National Security Division approval is unnecessary.148  
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Because the process for obtaining a reporter’s telephone records via 
an NSL is completely different than subpoenaing that reporter to testify, 
NSLs appear to provide the government with a means of obtaining 
information typically sought by subpoenaing a reporter without abiding 
by the DOJ guidelines. Consequently, the government’s use of NSLs in 
the newsgathering context may not reflect the DOJ’s stated policy “to 
provide protection to members of the news media from certain law 
enforcement tools	.	.	.	that might unreasonably impair newsgathering 
activities.”149 Instead, these rules indicate that as long as the NSL is 
relevant to a national security investigation,150 the government has the 
means to bypass the DOJ guidelines because the reporter’s testimony is 
unnecessary. Although NSLs are indeed an effective means of 
protecting national security interests, providing additional oversight 
over the use of NSLs in the newsgathering context would not inhibit this 
goal; it would simply reflect the government’s prior acknowledgment of 
the importance of journalist-source communications.  
The FBI’s use of NSLs is likely to exacerbate the chilling effects on 
both sources and reporters already stemming from the lenient DOJ 
guidelines and increased advancements in surveillance technology.151 
Because sources fear the government’s ability to turn “seemingly 
innocuous e-mails not containing classified information” into a crime,152 
the ease with which the FBI can obtain this extremely personal 
information through NSLs further diminishes the likelihood that sources 
will even communicate with members of the press, let alone disclose 
information to journalists—confidential or not. Considering the FBI’s 
track record of abusing these national security tools,153 even people who 
are completely innocent of any wrongdoing may be justified in fearing 
their electronic trails will be used against them. Additionally, the steps 
that journalist take to evade government intrusion into their work may 
also frustrate the newsgathering process. In 2014, The Washington Post 
reporter Barton Gellman publicly announced that he was “told his 
phone records were obtained at one point” through an NSL, which has 
led him to devote more time dealing with “technical and operational 
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security.”154 Gellman noted that the time and effort he now spends 
“protect[ing] sources	.	.	.	from the sort of digital trails that will lead 
straight to them” is a “tax” on his reporting ability.155  
CONCLUSION 
While the implementation of a federal reporter’s privilege has been 
viewed as the easiest and most effective remedy to the post-Branzburg 
inconsistency, the post-Sterling developments indicate that this is no 
longer a realistic solution when confidential information is at issue. The 
lenient and unenforceable DOJ guidelines do not provide adequate 
protection for reporters, and the revisions made in response to the 
Sterling controversy do very little to remedy this problem. Even if the 
guideline revisions had filled in some of the gaps, advances in 
surveillance technology and the FBI’s use of NSLs appear to have 
rendered the reporter subpoena an essentially useless tool by providing 
the government with the means to bypass the subpoena process 
altogether. 
So long as the government is still able to gather information 
regarding confidential communications between a reporter and her 
source through other means, a federal testimonial privilege will be of 
little value to those that it is intended to protect. Only when the 
government is able to be truly transparent with its journalist surveillance 
techniques will the adverse effects begin to subside. 
ELIZABETH L. ROBINSON** 
 
 154. Darren Samuelsohn, Barton Gellman Aware of Legal Risks, POLITICO (Feb. 25, 2014, 
6:27 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2014/02/barton-gellman-aware-of-legal-risks-
183998 [https://perma.cc/J9C6-7RQZ].  
 155. Id. 
 **  I’d first like to thank my editor, Catherine Smith, as well as Professor Mary-Rose 
Papandrea, Professor Bill Marshall, Lee Royster, and the rest of the North Carolina Law 
Review Staff and Board. This Recent Development would not have been possible without 
your diligence and unwavering patience. I’d also like to thank my parents, the most selfless 
and hard-working people I know, for their constant encouragement. Finally, to my brother 
Alex, thank you for always challenging me to be a better person. 
